ABSTRACT
Since the demise of socialism and the breakdown of the so-called “Asian model of capitalism” many observers are inclined to believe that all economic systems will eventually converge toward a specific set of optimal or “best practice” institutions. This general mood notwithstanding, there are also many complaints about the actual implementation of institutional regimes recommended as being “optimal” by international organizations like the IMF, and there are still “renegade states” like Mahathir’s Malaysia where deviant policies are pursued intentionally. Even if international organizations are not empowered to impose such a set of institutions, international negotiations within the framework of the WTO also follow the implicitly given idea that there is such a standard for reference. Yet, precisely those international negotiations demonstrate that there is still widespread disagreement about the appropriate institutions and controversy over the sovereign right of national governments to set up and maintain “deviant” institutions. This problem has become even more salient since in international negotiations the additional demand has been raised that national governments should also actively impose “best practice” even if the domestic market gives rise to seemingly deviant institutions spontaneously, that is without active government intervention. With this kind of an “educational” encroachment on sovereign rights under the umbrella of a global convergence of competition policies (WTO 1997), the issue of institutional convergence deserves some foundational theoretical consideration.
