ABSTRACT
The centrality of sanctions in two of the most pressing diplomatic crises of our time – the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises – is by no means a historical anomaly. Through the centuries, sanctions have been prominent in many of history’s most pivotal moments. Thucydides’ classic history of the Peloponnesian War, for instance, describes a trade boycott
imposed by Athens on Sparta’s ally Megara in 432 BCE, which
was widely believed to have caused the Peloponnesian War.1 By contrast, following the conclusion of the First World War
US President Woodrow Wilson reflected a sense of optimism
regarding the use of sanctions when he described them as a ‘peaceful, silent, deadly remedy’, the application of which would mean that ‘there will be no need for force’.2 Sanctions were once again at the centre of the second catastrophic conflict
of the twentieth century; the US fuel and steel embargo on Japan is widely viewed as motivating the latter’s December 1941
attack on Pearl Harbor.3 More recently, the perceived failure of comprehensive sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s was
a central component of neo-conservative arguments as to why unilateral military force needed to be applied against Saddam
Hussein’s regime in March 2003.4 Outlining the Bush administration’s case for removing Saddam in a speech delivered in August 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney referred specifically
to the failure of UN sanctions: ‘Saddam has perfected the game of shoot and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and
deception. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions.’5
