ABSTRACT
Ethics is commonly considered a realm of inexact standards, unpredictable
exceptions, ‘grey areas’, and subjectivity. Even those who believe in moral
rules tend to think that they admit of exceptions or should be stated with
qualifiers such as ‘normally’, ‘for the most part’ and ‘other things equal’.
Aristotle formulated a major point underlying this view when he said,
regarding the mean between excess and deficiency, that it is ‘relative to us’
(Nicomachean Ethics 1107a). The influence of this point in his presentation
of the ‘Golden Mean’, especially taken together with Aristotelian virtue ethics in general, has been enormous. The point does not depend on virtue
ethics, though any virtue ethicist is likely to accept it and to hold that what
we ought to do on a given occasion depends on what virtue requires in the
circumstances. To say this, however, is not only to relativize obligation to
circumstances, as nearly every moral theorist would, but, in effect, to inter-
pose the complex and controversial concept of virtue between circumstance
and action. Is there a better alternative that enables us to determine our
obligations more directly? In seeking to avoid excessive relativity, it is natural for philosophers to
search for basic principles. For many philosophers, and particularly for
those constructing an ethical system, only principles that are both clear and
highly general will suffice. Quite apart from any theoretical concerns, it is
also natural for moral agents to seek clarity and generality in ethics. Ethical
generality facilitates the teaching of ethics to children, the guidance of
moral decisions, the justification of moral judgments, and the formulation
of laws and social policies. Examples of general moral principles abound; recall those corresponding to the prohibitions of lying, stealing, and killing
that are expressed in the Ten Commandments. Among those put forward by
philosophers, there are probably none more widely cited than Kant’s cate-
gorical imperative or Mill’s principle of utility (though, to be sure, in vary-
ing formulations). The central question I want to pursue is what kind of
generality moral principles may exhibit.
