ABSTRACT
In the “Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore”, Wittgenstein rejects Russell’s theory of types. He claims that it is impossible (NB, 109) because what can be said in language can never be said by language, but instead shows its meaning in its use. The purpose of this chapter will be to argue that Wittgenstein’s notion of showing is the motivation for his objections to Russell’s theory of types. Following this discussion we shall consider the connection between Wittgenstein’s notion of showing and his notion of the mystical in order to draw the distinction between “how the world is” and “that it is” and the consequence of this difference on problems such as Russell’s solution to his paradox. Although this chapter is in the form of a critique of Russell’s theory of types, its purpose is to make clear the distinction between the two views of philosophy we fi nd in Russell and Wittgenstein. We begin with a brief look at Russell’s paradox and the solution he offers in the theory of types.
