ABSTRACT
One of the most central and familiar elements of Wittgenstein’s later philo-
sophy is his call to replace the traditional inquiries of philosophy with
investigation into the ‘‘use’’ (Gebrauch) of words in their various practical
connections and surroundings, linguistic and non-linguistic.1 Again and
again, Wittgenstein counsels his readers to abandon the search for ‘‘deep’’
or esoteric inquiries into the nature of things, in favor of reminders of the
ways we actually employ language in the vast variety of contexts and situa-
tions that comprise a human life. But despite the familiarity and widespread influence of Wittgenstein’s appeal to use, I argue in this chapter, this appeal
has a critical significance that commentators have often missed. What has
been missed in projects that construe Wittgenstein as offering a theory of
meaning as grounded in social practice, in fact, is a far-ranging critique of
totality that runs through Wittgenstein’s work, early and late.
