ABSTRACT
In Chapter 1 I claimed that we tend to respond to ethical views under the
sway of both a pro-pragmatic and an anti-pragmatic intuition. Since it is
extremely pragmatic, Act Teleology gains support from the pro-pragmatic
intuition. However, in some cases its implications clash with the anti-prag-
matic intuition. In these cases we have the sense that Act Teleology is
insufficiently principled, and so we may consider modifying it or departing
from it in some way. If so, we should examine the features that make it
very pragmatic and consider whether to endorse them on reflection. At the end of Chapter 1 I suggested that if we are moved by the anti-pragmatic
intuition we should focus on two of Act Teleology’s structural features in
particular: its consequence-neutrality, and the fact that it is act-based. We
should consider adopting a discounting view, or adopting a broader unit of
action.