ABSTRACT
As was shown in the previous chapter, transitions to democracy in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s were accompanied by a general trend of reform within the judicial branch. Ostensibly, the judicial reforms in Latin America targeted, in the first instance, the legendary lack of judicial independence. This chapter explores the extent to which judicial reforms have contributed to more independent judiciaries in the region. The first three sections revisit the theory of judicial independence applied to Latin America, while the following sections seek to assess the independence of the judicial branch, particularly from the executive, in the twelve countries considered (Mexico, Costa Rica and the ten countries of South America) during the 1990s. In so doing, it explores three main areas of external independence of the judiciary1: the tenure of judges, the appointment of judges’ procedure and the financial independence of the judicial branch. The final section puts forward a comparative assessment of judicial independence, emphasizing the uneven nature of the judicial reforms as part of the general process of democratic consolidation in Latin America.
