Statebuilding After Victory

There has been considerable research in recent years examining patterns of post-conflict state-building that focused on cases of negotiated settlements where the international community had high levels of involvement through peacekeeping operations (Stedman et al., 2002; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Paris and Sisk, 2009). This scholarship has produced important findings on the dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions that help us understand why some peace processes collapse, some result in weak regimes, and some lead to sustainable peace-building. Other scholars have drawn attention to the importance of processes to ‘demilitarize politics’ so that the warring parties may be transformed into political parties that can participate effectively in post-conflict politics (Lyons, 2005; Kovacs, 2007; Manning, 2008; de Zeeuw, 2007). What is less clearly understood, however, is how these processes differ in cases where civil war ended in victory. While the percentage of civil wars that ended in negotiations grew dramatically in the 1990s, 40 per cent still ended in victory (Toft, 2010a, b: 6). Limited international intervention and support for liberal statebuilding in these cases allows greater focus on local actors and dynamics. ¹