ABSTRACT
WHEN Jimmy Carter became president, there was no crisis in the Midle East and therefore no immediate reason to engage in diplomacy. The negotiating process had stalemated. Nevertheless, Washington was still concerned that Arab-Israeli nonbelligerency could degenerate into conflict, and there was also concern about the high price of oil. Another oil embargo did not seem likely, but in Washington, the threat of it lingered as a possibility. Where there was any urgency driving policy, it centered on the belief that if Arab support could be enlisted for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement, then Arab attempts at blackmailing the United States could be avoided. 1 If, after taking office in January 1977, Carter had told Vance and Brzezinski that before the end of the year he expected Sadat to visit Israel and Begin to reciprocate with a visit to Egypt, then both advisers would have thought that the commander-in-chief knew very little about the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The new year was to start with the goal of finding a comprehensive Middle East settlement via another conference at Geneva, not with responding to an Israeli government request for Egypt’s national anthem so it could be played properly upon Sadat’s arrival in Jerusalem!
