ABSTRACT
When it comes to US policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is there such a thing as a meaningful pro-Arab lobby capable of countering pro-Israel pressure? Or is it the case, as some have asserted, that in comparison to the pro-Israel lobby, “pro-Arab interest groups are weak to non-existent?”1 The very fact that the American public and its policymakers have come to prefer the two-state solution suggests that such remarks may be overly dismissive of factors that, aside from the pro-Israel lobby, play a role in US policy concerning Israel and the Palestinians. And, given the increasingly common position that “the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics,”2 this book makes the case that reactions to domestic and international developments by public opinion, policymakers, and the pro-Arab lobby, in addition to the pro-Israel lobby, are important to understanding the American posture toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly as it pertains to unprecedented calls for a Palestinian state from the highest levels of the US government. First, a brief background on the US foreign policy shift in question is in
order. After the 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, American policymakers heightened their support of the Jewish state as a Cold War ally. Israel strengthened its hold over the West Bank and Gaza while the United States denied the Palestinians’ right to self-determination on those captured territories. It was widely believed that the exercise of that right posed a threat to the Jewish state’s existence.3 As the relationship between the US and Israel deepened into a “strategic alliance” under the Ronald Reagan administration and a Congress dominated by the pro-Israel lobby, American policy rejected Palestinian nationalism while acquiescing to Israel’s dominion over the occupied land.4 Decades later, the United States remained committed to its Jewish ally but for reasons that will be the focus of the chapters to follow, accepted Palestinian autonomy and ultimately sought a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to President George W. Bush,
the two-state vision and the roadmap for peace designed to implement it, command nearly universal support as the best means of achieving a permanent peace and an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967. United Nations Security Council resolutions have repeatedly spoken of the desirability of establishing two independent states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side within secure and recognized borders.5
The resolutions referred to by President Bush include 1397 (2002) and 1515 (2003). All concerned international actors, including Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA), the European Union (EU), the Russian Federation, and the Arab League,6 have endorsed the two-state solution as articulated by the Bush administration’s “roadmap,” which outlined steps for a “permanent two-state solution.”7
