ABSTRACT
Modern warfare at sea has shown that although successes can be achieved by force-on-force combat or attrition and relying primarily on advanced technologies, such cases are rare. To have any lasting value, naval tactical successes must be achieved as part of a larger and broader framework determined by strategy and policy. However, the strategic framework is too large to properly orchestrate tactical actions at sea to accomplish the aims of policy and strategy. At the same time, the tactical framework is too narrow to bridge the gap separating it from strategy. Therefore, another field of study and practice must exist to properly synchronize or orchestrate all available sources of military and nonmilitary power in order to accomplish the ultimate strategic objective through a series of intermediate objectives. This third component of military art (alternatively called here operational art and operational warfare) occupies an intermediate position between policy and strategy on the one hand and tactics on the other. Operational art serves both as a bridge and as an interface between these two areas of study and practice.
