ABSTRACT
In these pages I develop an understanding of the mature philosophical system proposed by G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716). The ‘‘mature’’ system is usually dated to 1686 and thereafter. The Monadology, written in 1714, is the most familiar work that sets forth the main doctrines. I aim to discover what Russell here calls the ‘‘superstructure of Leibniz’s
philosophical edifice.’’ Sudden flashes of insight are supplemented by a sustained effort to understand the precise details of the various metaphysical accounts and to push for maximum coherence among them. The analyses, which are based on a thorough study of the relevant texts, build upon one another – culminating in a complex series of definitions that capture all of Leibniz’s constraints on a given type of object. The end result is this. While not all themes from the mature philosophy
can be made to cohere with one another, two very important features do fit together on the analysis offered here. Those two features are monads – Leibniz’s famous purely spiritual substances which perceive and strive – and animals. Typically these two elements are seen as exclusive alternatives, so that taking one means leaving the other behind. Here they live in harmony. The task of saying exactly how they can coexist peacefully is a long and difficult one. But it is well worth doing, since it unifies Leibniz’s mature vision of the universe in a way hitherto unimagined. In a word, I offer the reader freedom. Freedom from the expectations of
tradition and time-honored readings of Leibniz that have managed to gain ascendancy. Freedom from preconceived notions about what Leibniz’s system should look like. Freedom from the narrowness and bias found in some mainstream commentaries – a bias which is as noxious to Leibniz studies as it is to historical studies generally. The ‘‘readings’’ I’m talking about find, in
certain select claims, Leibniz’s deepest, most important philosophy and then discount or explain away or render metaphorical those that won’t go along. One of several Leibnizian paradigms becomes the lens through which to view all the texts. My paradigms flow out of the texts. If they don’t align logically I never-
theless derive them in all their pluralistic splendor. They are viewed as theories of Reality, not absolute pronouncements about Reality. So concern over consistency across these models can be set aside, granting the texts freedom to lead us to the theories they portend. ‘‘Portend’’ indeed. The theories are seldom there waiting to be expounded.
