ABSTRACT
There is only one move left in the grand dialectic of argumentation about aggregates. One might try to construct a philosophical reconciliation of Realism and Idealism. After all, what could be more Leibnizian in spirit than bringing together warring factions, reconciling the estranged, assimilating the alien? I will call attempts to do that Compatibilism – with the noted restriction
that this title will designate ‘‘Idealist Compatibilists,’’ as only Idealists have offered detailed defenses of this claim. Consider an analogy – which, while not perfect, serves as a point of
departure. A famous cosmologist seems to adhere to both the Ptolemaic and Coper-
nican theories of the universe. She is very often found endorsing one and the other in the same texts. It is thought that this means she considers both True and consistent with one another – that they are, perhaps in some hidden way, compatible after all. ‘‘Why else would she feel free to endorse both simultaneously?’’ A new theory – ‘‘Ptolernicanism’’ – is devised to reconcile the inconsistencies and thus defend her rationality. That theory holds that ‘‘the earth is the center of the cosmos’’ and ‘‘the sun is the center of the cosmos’’ are both True and fully compatible. A famous philosopher seems to adhere to both Idealism and Realism. He
is very often found endorsing one and the other in the same texts. It is thought that this means he considers both True and consistent with one another – that they are, perhaps in some hidden way, compatible after all. ‘‘Why else would he feel free to endorse both simultaneously?’’ A Compatibilist theory is devised to reconcile the inconsistencies and thus to defend his rationality. That theory holds that ‘‘bodies are mind-dependent’’ and ‘‘bodies are mind-independent’’ are both True and fully compatible. It seems these famous people are mad. Unless, perhaps, a creative approach is taken in the reconciliation-projects
represented in the new ‘‘hybrid’’ theories. That is, in Ptolernicanism, the two theories of planetary motion are not taken to be on an equal footing and their claims combined in a wholesale sort of way. Instead, the reconciliation is accomplished by giving Copernicanism the upper hand, and
working in as much of the Ptolemaic theory as will fit. Similarly with Compatibilism: it is not an across-the-board joining of Idealism and Realism. Instead, Idealism is granted the upper hand and one works in as much of Realism as will fit. Indeed, it is this latter project that Idealist Compatibilists take on. Of
course they hope to capture all of Realism in this way – thus to construct a complete Compatibilism in which no inconsistencies remain. I will proceed by laying out adequacy conditions for Compatibilism, and
then examine how existing theories fare in regard to those conditions.
