ABSTRACT
In the late sixties, the growth of the PPP had been spontaneous. Much of the vitality, energy and enthusiasm of the early years was infused by young left wing cadres. They were galvanised into organising effective mass protests by a dynamic and vibrant landlord from Sind, who possessed the explosive ability to translate widespread grievances into an agitation which debilitated a military regime. A critical component in Bhutto's meteoric success in mass politics, was a realisation that it was not sufficient to confine himself to a critique of Ayub Khan's rule. The PPP symbolised and articulated an alternative — a vision of a democratic, socialist society. On this basis Bhutto courted mass appeal, and it was on this basis that virtually the whole of the left in Punjab and Sind swarmed to the PPP. Also well represented in the PPP, however, were Sindhi landlords, even at the initial stage of party formation. Some of them supported reforms of the existing political and economic structure, although they naturally differed with members of the urban left on the scale of necessary reforms. Other landlords in the party fold were more conservative but politically astute. They saw the PPP as a party which would promote greater representation for Sindhis at the national level. The PPP's strategy in the 1970 election campaign was thus based on the support of traditional feudal forces in Sind combined with an appeal to the disadvantaged social groups in urban Punjab and Sind. A third aspect of the PPP's evolution was the support given to Bhutto by factions within the army. Unlike Mujib, Bhutto's relationship with the army was not entirely adversarial. Not only had Bhutto been a leading member of a military government, but he also had substantial support within the army, when he launched his campaign against Ayub Khan. These factions were dissatisfied with Ayub, particularly with his handling of the 1965 war. In harmony with their frustrations were Bhutto's accusations that Ayub lost on the negotiating table in Tashkent what the Pakistan army had won in the '65 war. This
encouraged the dangerous belief that Pakistan was capable of defeating India militarily, if only its leaders showed greater resolve.
