ABSTRACT
All of us know Nietzsche's simple definition of the reversal of Platonism. To reverse Platonism means that we value this world in itself, immanently, and no longer value it in relation to transcendent forms such as the Platonic idea of the good. In other words, the revaluation of existence means that existence is measured neither in terms of an origin from which existence might be said to have fallen nor in terms of an end toward which existence might be said to be advancing. More precisely, we must say that the reversal of Platonism means that the duration of existence has no beginning and it has no end. It has no primary origin and no ultimate destination. In the reversal, the time of duration becomes unlimited, and time itself looks to be composed of nothing but fragments and remainders. While we started out from a well-known definition of the reversal of Platonism, we have ended up in a complicated idea. The reversal of Platonism leads us to the idea of time imagined as a line that has no terminal points, a line that never bends itself back into a circle. It leads us to the imagination of an unlimited straight line. It seems to me that, despite all the philosophical reflections on time that have taken place across the twentieth century, the implications of the idea of unlimited time remain, at the least, under-determined, and, more likely, I think, the implications remain largely unknown.
