ABSTRACT
In Chapter 3 we argued for a lifeworld-led care that could benefit from a focus on well-being as an important phenomenon in its own right. Building on the existential phenomenological tradition we began to offer a view of well-being as something much more than just the absence of illness. We have indicated how an articulation of what well-being is, is needed because it provides a positive understanding for the direction of care. Our view of well-being has been evolving, and this prompted us to dive deeply into this issue by going back to particular existential philosophical ideas. This chapter outlines these explorations and introduces our dwelling-mobility theory that is grounded in the ontological writings of Martin Heidegger:
The proper dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the essence of dwelling, that they ever learn to dwell.
(Heidegger, 1993b, p. 363). In this chapter we offer a theory of well-being that has been centrally informed by Heidegger’s notion of ‘homecoming’. We do not systematically present Heidegger’s scholarly exposition and refer readers to other relevant texts (Heidegger, 1927/1962; 1966; 1971; 1973; 1993a; 1993b). Rather, we will draw on a particular aspect of Heidegger’s later works in relation to homecoming and a particular development of this that he calls ‘Gegnet’. We pursue the implications that these aspects of his work provide for an existential theory of well-being. This theory includes the notion of ‘dwelling’, the notion of ‘mobility’, and the unity of these two dimensions (Gegnet as ‘abiding expanse’). More than providing a philosophical description of ‘abiding expanse’ we are particularly interested in how this possibility can be experienced by human beings as a great resource and possible direction.