ABSTRACT
The civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997), in addition to being costly and traumatic for the inhabitants of that country, posed serious questions for Iran and Russia as they grappled with momentous changes of their own. The way each dealt with Tajikistan mattered not only in terms of bilateral relations with that country, but also as an element of relations between Tehran and Moscow. By mid-1992, when the civil war began in newly independent Tajikistan, Iran was still in the process of adjusting to politics after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the end of its devastating war with Iraq in 1988. Post-Soviet Russia confronted a range of contentious issues relating to the nature and extent of domestic reforms, its general international orientation, and its relation to its fellow successor states. Both Iran and Russia also watched regional conflicts with unease, including the Gulf War of 1991, the continuing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Qarabagh, and the agony of Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the fall of the Najibullah regime in April 1992. Neither Iran nor Russia welcomed the efforts of other countries, including the United States and Turkey, to develop relations with the formerly Soviet republics of Central Asia. Iran found Russia useful as a source of weapons to replenish its depleted arsenal, while Russia welcomed the hard-currency sales to Iran. As Tajikistan’s civil war dragged on, until the peace accord of 1997, additional concerns, such as Russia’s sale of nuclear reactor technology to Iran, differences of opinion about access to the resources of the Caspian Sea, and both countries’ displeasure over the expansion of NATO, also affected the context in which Tehran and Moscow dealt with each other regarding Tajikistan.
