ABSTRACT
Having expressed the regret and disapproval with which I had learnt that the Japanese Government had taken so serious a step as to break off the Washington discussions, I questioned Mr. Togo about reports which had been broadcast on the British wireless late the previous evening that Japanese warships and transports were proceeding westwards across the Gulf of Siam, adding that the report, if true, could not but carry the most serious implications. His reply was that reports had reached him of large concentrations of British and Indian troops on the frontier of Siam, disposed for purposes of attack, and that Japanese warships had accordingly been ordered to patrol off the coast of Indo-China. I reminded the Minister of a statement I had made to him on the 5th instant to the general effect that there was no question whatever of any attack being made by British troops against Siamese territory so long as Siam's independence was respected by Japan. Mr. Togo answered, as he had done on the 5th instant, that he had asked urgently for a report from the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok as to the facts about these rumoured troop movements and that he was not really in a position to discuss this matter until that report had been received. I insisted that, as a Japanese convoy was already on its way, the matter had become one of the utmost urgency; and I requested that orders should be sent immediately to ensure that no initiative was taken by the Japanese forces
on the spot until we had had time to discuss the matter further, adding that I would answer for it that no initiative would be taken by the British forces. It was, I said, essential at this critical juncture that the movement ofJ apanese forces in the area should be fully controlled from Tokyo. The Minister replied that naturally Japanese troop movements would be so controlled.
