ABSTRACT
In Part II, we consider Christianity from the perspective of epistemic relativism. To be epistemically relative about Christianity within a critically realistic framework is to do more than merely acknowledge that Christianity is a controversial and disputed phenomenon. Specifically, it is necessary to recognise: (1) that Christianity makes alethic truth claims about the ultimate ontological ground, nature and structure of reality; (2) that these truth claims are contested, both within and beyond the Christian community; and (3) that it is nevertheless possible to make informed judgements regarding the veracity of Christian truth claims, on the understanding that such judgements are themselves open to further evaluation. These criteria apply to Christians themselves, as well as to those outside the Christian community. It is certainly true that there are many Christians and non-Christians who reject one or other of them: for example, fundamentalist Christians who insist that their truth claims are self-evident and beyond contestation, and secularists who deny that Christian truth claims are amenable to critical evaluation. A fundamental question, in the present context, is whether those who deny that Christianity is epistemically relative have a legitimate warrant to do so. In Chapter 5 we will consider the extent to which Christianity is capable of embracing epistemic relativism, and in Chapter 6 we will ask whether Christian claims to possess exclusive access to ultimate truth are compatible with epistemic relativism. The present chapter sets out to prepare the ground for those discussions by addressing the question of the identity of Christianity. ‘Christianity’ is a significantly underdetermined umbrella label that covers a multitude of different spiritual experiences, communal traditions and ultimate truth claims. Unless we first identify the particular version of ‘Christi anity’ we wish to discuss, we run the risk of embarking on an over-generalised exchange, whose conclusions will be vulnerable to a plethora of qualifications. In addressing the question of the identity of Christianity we will call upon the under-labouring services of critical realism. I will argue that accounts of Christian identity that function within essentialist and nominalist frameworks are not merely insufficiently robust to illuminate the issue of epistemic relativism, but — and more importantly — contain within themselves an inbuilt drive to epistemic closure. Critical realism, on the other hand, provides an interpretive framework sufficiently powerful to shed light on the question of Christian identity in a manner that foregrounds, and does full justice to, the issue of epistemic relativism. In addition, a critically realistic exploration of question of Christian identity lends strong support to our decision to focus primarily on the classical tradition of orthodox Trinitarian Christianity in the rest of this study.
