Physical Objects

IN the last chapter I have been speaking as though the belief in the existence of independent physical objects in a realist sense were true. My purpose in this was to see whether the representative theory, which had such a large share in the development of idealism, is defensible or not, and whether the realist could meet the idealist satisfactorily by merely maintaining a theory of direct perception instead. But it remains for us to try to defend the view (a) that our ordinary statements about physical objects mean what the realist thinks they mean, (b) that some of them are true. Against this many thinkers have maintained that what we call physical objects have no existence apart from human (and animal) experience, or that, while there are things external to us, we cannot be justified in saying anything about them except that they produce such-and-such experiences, or, better, sensa, when we observe them. ¹ The name phenomenalism ² is commonly given to these types of view, and I shall adopt this terminology. According to phenomenalism any statements purporting to be about physical objects can be true or defensible only if they are translated into statements about human experience.