ABSTRACT
The information work undertaken during a criminal investigation (Chapters 6, 7 and 8), which is collected by CSEs (Chapter 9) and analysed by forensic scientists, analysts and technicians (Chapter 10) is directed towards the successful identification and prosecution of the individual who has committed the crime under investigation. When this information work is presented to the court as the narrative of the crime event, its function is to tag, define, identify, describe, and emphasise the ‘criminal’ (Tannenbaum, 1938:19): in other words, the courtroom process is the labelling of the ‘criminal body’. Forensic evidence, in its reconstructed form, aids in the labelling process; however, the very nature of this reconstruction is fraught with numerous difficulties. I have already introduced problems with the concepts of individualisation and probative weight, and this current chapter expands upon these issues in relation to their application in criminal trials. It examines how science and the legal system, despite their well-known differences, interact to test and develop each other’s methodologies, frames of reference and rules of engagement. For the most part, despite the rigorous methodologies and testing used by scientists, the courts can and have rejected new scientific ideas when they do not follow the evidential rules set out by law. This chapter examines this process by examining the relationship between science and the law; the development of the scientific expert and the problems associated with expert testimony produced within the adversarial framework; and the reasoning strategies used by scientists when presenting their evidence to the court and jury.
