ABSTRACT
In this chapter we aim to clarify the debate over the particular question of whether there might have been nothing, and the more general question of the nature of modality, by introducing the concept of a Modal Theory and investigating its form. We begin by arguing that the question of whether there might have been nothing can be pursued independently of the question of the nature of possible worlds; that is, we can investigate what possibilities there are without having to investigate what possibilities are. A theory that governs what possibilities there are we call a ‘Modal Theory’. We then draw attention to the fact that modal theorists, to date, have typically assumed that modal theories are single-criterion, that is, that they have the form: p iff ◇q for nondisjunctive p. 1 In response, we challenge the reasons we take for this assumption and then present an argument for Modal Theory having multiple criteria, a view we dub ‘modal pluralism’. We then investigate the forms of the axioms of such a multiple-criterion Modal Theory, and we conclude by drawing lessons for the debate over whether there might have been nothing.
