ABSTRACT
THE alternative to Palmerston's method of suppression by treaty and the use of naval force was to annex the chief slave exporting areas of Africa. This policy found no favour with the statesmen of the early-Victorian period. Every party was averse to taking on fresh colonial commitments. Many, such as Disraeli in his unregenerate days, were opposed to the idea of holding colonies at all; he changed his mind on this, as on other matters, but Gladstone disapproved of annexation to the end. The sooner we parted from our colonies the better, said Cobden, the Free Traders and the Little Englanders. At the same time the determination to suppress the African Slave Trade continued firm, though not as widespread as in the early years of the Abolitionist movement. As time went on and the traditional method brought no decisive success, as the growth of legitimate commerce continued to languish in the face of the more lucrative trade in slaves, the British Government was forced along the road to annexation. From long and expensive experience it was found that the only way to close Whydah and the Lagos lagoons against the depredations of the slave dealers was to annex some strategic point on the coast; similarly, and with even greater reluctance, it was at length conceded that the only way to stop the Arab trade was to annex part of the East African coastline. In the fifty years preceding the Scramble for Africa such views were not popular at home: they were only held by naval officers, missionaries and merchants on the spot. The story of the annexation of Lagos shows how slowly, and almost accidentally, the British began to embark on a policy which ultimately gained for her those possessions in Africa which amply compensated for a long and single-handed humanitarian crusade.
