ABSTRACT

The negotiations’ final phase took place against a backdrop of French military despair and Vietminh confidence. General René Cogny, the aggressive and usually resolute commander in Tonkin, advised US officials that while he could probably hold Hanoi and Haiphong in the immediate future, the railroad and highway artery between the two towns had become severely constricted. Following one of Cogny’s briefings, US diplomats concluded: “the longer run military prospects here seem very dim indeed.” 1 General Edmond Jouhaud, commander of the Air Force in Asia and a future diehard OAS leader in Algeria, appeared to McClintock as “unfeignedly pessimistic” and in a “mood bordering on despair.” 2 Captured documents, found on a dead Vietminh officer, revealed instructions from Giap, dated 16 June, and an opposite atmosphere within the DRV command. Giap noted the increased strength of his units, their superior morale, and the need to sustain a stranglehold on the Delta in support of diplomatic action at Geneva. However, he ordered no major assault as long as negotiations continued. 3 DRV leaders accepted Chinese and Soviet advice that there should be no escalation in Tonkin during the conference. Moreover, it made no sense to expend resources on assets that could be taken at the peace table. The military balance in Tonkin appeared poised to produce an armistice built around a French withdrawal from northern Vietnam.