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Investment decisions and finance, which under high collectivism were undertaken by the state and the collectives, have now been extended to the peasants as well. Individuals, households and groups of peasants may now purchase equipment and use credit to finance productive activities. In agri-culture, under the specialised and production contracting types of responsi-bility system, the collectives provide investment funds and stipulate their use, while under 'contracting in a big way' it is the peasants' own responsibility to invest in the land and the annual crop. Division of the Social Product The state still has the first claim on the social product through taxation. And the collectives still have the next claim for their own accumulation which they exercise either by retaining a share of output before setting aside a distribution fund (under the specialised and production contracting responsibility systems which use work points) or by stipulating rent-like payments in 'contracting in a big way'. Then comes the share for distribution to the peasant producers. Under specialised and production contracting, this share is still subject to collective mediation, since it is allocated in the form of work points which are a claim on a share of the collective distributable income. The use of bonuses and penalties in these systems complicates matters. The most extreme depar-ture from this principle of collective determination occurs under 'contracting in a big way', where peasants' incomes are simply the residual of what they have produced after remitting their taxes and quotas. But in the more moderate forms of responsibility system, it is mistaken to think that collective distri-bution of income has been abolished. It has not. But there probably has been a marked attenuation of the extent to which this collective mediation of income is subject to collective determination and control. Under high collectivism, decisions about income distribution - how much collective income to distri-bute, what distributive criteria to use and how to apply them - were often subject to lively mass participation. They were based upon and in turn provided the basis for direct mass supervision of the work process. Under contractual collectivism, the contracting process is probably less subject to collective democratic participation, although for now this can only be an hypothesis for future research. Whatever the case may be, where peasants' incomes are, under the specialised and production contract responsibility systems, still subject to collective mediation (through the work point), peasants have lost much of their capacity to control or influence the collective actions through which their incomes are mediated. This may well be another aspect of their major contradiction discussed above: that peasants must depend on each other but have no means of controlling each other. Exchange State determination of almost all prices has now given way to a more variegated pricing structure. For certain basic staples (like grain and cotton), prices remain under close state regulation although they have been adjusted to improve incentives and take greater account of scarcities. For other products, prices have been allowed to seek levels more closely in accord with shadow
DOI link for Investment decisions and finance, which under high collectivism were undertaken by the state and the collectives, have now been extended to the peasants as well. Individuals, households and groups of peasants may now purchase equipment and use credit to finance productive activities. In agri-culture, under the specialised and production contracting types of responsi-bility system, the collectives provide investment funds and stipulate their use, while under 'contracting in a big way' it is the peasants' own responsibility to invest in the land and the annual crop. Division of the Social Product The state still has the first claim on the social product through taxation. And the collectives still have the next claim for their own accumulation which they exercise either by retaining a share of output before setting aside a distribution fund (under the specialised and production contracting responsibility systems which use work points) or by stipulating rent-like payments in 'contracting in a big way'. Then comes the share for distribution to the peasant producers. Under specialised and production contracting, this share is still subject to collective mediation, since it is allocated in the form of work points which are a claim on a share of the collective distributable income. The use of bonuses and penalties in these systems complicates matters. The most extreme depar-ture from this principle of collective determination occurs under 'contracting in a big way', where peasants' incomes are simply the residual of what they have produced after remitting their taxes and quotas. But in the more moderate forms of responsibility system, it is mistaken to think that collective distri-bution of income has been abolished. It has not. But there probably has been a marked attenuation of the extent to which this collective mediation of income is subject to collective determination and control. Under high collectivism, decisions about income distribution - how much collective income to distri-bute, what distributive criteria to use and how to apply them - were often subject to lively mass participation. They were based upon and in turn provided the basis for direct mass supervision of the work process. Under contractual collectivism, the contracting process is probably less subject to collective democratic participation, although for now this can only be an hypothesis for future research. Whatever the case may be, where peasants' incomes are, under the specialised and production contract responsibility systems, still subject to collective mediation (through the work point), peasants have lost much of their capacity to control or influence the collective actions through which their incomes are mediated. This may well be another aspect of their major contradiction discussed above: that peasants must depend on each other but have no means of controlling each other. Exchange State determination of almost all prices has now given way to a more variegated pricing structure. For certain basic staples (like grain and cotton), prices remain under close state regulation although they have been adjusted to improve incentives and take greater account of scarcities. For other products, prices have been allowed to seek levels more closely in accord with shadow
Investment decisions and finance, which under high collectivism were undertaken by the state and the collectives, have now been extended to the peasants as well. Individuals, households and groups of peasants may now purchase equipment and use credit to finance productive activities. In agri-culture, under the specialised and production contracting types of responsi-bility system, the collectives provide investment funds and stipulate their use, while under 'contracting in a big way' it is the peasants' own responsibility to invest in the land and the annual crop. Division of the Social Product The state still has the first claim on the social product through taxation. And the collectives still have the next claim for their own accumulation which they exercise either by retaining a share of output before setting aside a distribution fund (under the specialised and production contracting responsibility systems which use work points) or by stipulating rent-like payments in 'contracting in a big way'. Then comes the share for distribution to the peasant producers. Under specialised and production contracting, this share is still subject to collective mediation, since it is allocated in the form of work points which are a claim on a share of the collective distributable income. The use of bonuses and penalties in these systems complicates matters. The most extreme depar-ture from this principle of collective determination occurs under 'contracting in a big way', where peasants' incomes are simply the residual of what they have produced after remitting their taxes and quotas. But in the more moderate forms of responsibility system, it is mistaken to think that collective distri-bution of income has been abolished. It has not. But there probably has been a marked attenuation of the extent to which this collective mediation of income is subject to collective determination and control. Under high collectivism, decisions about income distribution - how much collective income to distri-bute, what distributive criteria to use and how to apply them - were often subject to lively mass participation. They were based upon and in turn provided the basis for direct mass supervision of the work process. Under contractual collectivism, the contracting process is probably less subject to collective democratic participation, although for now this can only be an hypothesis for future research. Whatever the case may be, where peasants' incomes are, under the specialised and production contract responsibility systems, still subject to collective mediation (through the work point), peasants have lost much of their capacity to control or influence the collective actions through which their incomes are mediated. This may well be another aspect of their major contradiction discussed above: that peasants must depend on each other but have no means of controlling each other. Exchange State determination of almost all prices has now given way to a more variegated pricing structure. For certain basic staples (like grain and cotton), prices remain under close state regulation although they have been adjusted to improve incentives and take greater account of scarcities. For other products, prices have been allowed to seek levels more closely in accord with shadow
ABSTRACT
Summary To what does the change from high collectivism to contractual collectivism amount to? What manner of beast is this new set of productive relations? Let us first say what it is not, in order to clear the air of simplistic analyses which have been advanced in various quarters. Contractual collectivism is not capitalist: it has not created unadulterated or primary private ownership (although it has expanded it within continuing collective ownership), and it has not separated the producers from the means of production. Nor does it spell the end of collectivism. It is not a return either to feudalism or to a private economy of independent smallholders. Rather, it forms a complex articulation of collective and private elements under reduced but still continuing state regulation.