Breadcrumbs Section. Click here to navigate to respective pages.
Chapter
Chapter
was a root cause of its collapse) the MEDA does not define a new role for this class in the model. The strategy concentrates on modern farming as the most rapid way of resolving the agrarian accumulation problem - food and investible surplus. At most, assuming that there is sufficient administrative capacity and skilled labour to implement the strategy, it will benefit the APP and the CAS, about half of agrarian production but only a quarter of the rural population. It would take place, moreover, basically on the irrigated and fertile Pacific plain where two-thirds of the population resides. Meanwhile, the land reform itself has effectively established a middle farmer and service co-operative group which occupies over half the rural population and provides the other half of production; this group has no specific part to play in the MEDA. Depending on the circumstances, this group might either develop into a 'kulak' class dependent on the market and opposed to further agrarian reform or else collapse and migrate to the towns in the long run. But in any case, it will be responsible for the bulk of the food production in the short term (which may well last for a decade) and thus requires specific attention. To overcome this contradiction, which is already apparent, the APP would have to restore part of the role of estate agriculture in the rural economic formation, acting as a point of articulation for small and medium farmers instead of acting as a competitor to them. This articulation essentially implies subordinating them to the state rather than marginalising them, but also means shifting input and investment resources towards them in exchange for guaranteed production sold to the state. It is too early to make a definitive characterisation of the Nicaraguan agrarian reform, not only because the Sandinist Revolution is still in an initial tran-sitional stage, but also because of the current war conditions which, depending upon external political factors, could change the direction of social change. None the less, the nature of the agrarian reform project, the experience of its implementation to date, and the long-term agricultural development proposal do provide elements for some tentative conclusions. First, that the three lessons learned from other agrarian reform experiences were applied to some effect. Namely: (a) that production must be maintained throug the reform period, in order to avoid collapse of exports or falling urban living standards; (b) that the process of nationalisation should not proceed faster than the capacity of the state to assimilate the private sector; (c) that while individual land distribution should be avoided, co-operativisation should be voluntary and gradual. In this way, the collapse of productive forces as production relations are transformed was avoided. Second, that it is possible to effectively remove the control of agrarian capital over the economy without land expropriation as such, if the 'sur-rounding' mechanisms such as commercialisation, credit and inputs are used effectively. Indeed it might even be suggested that social control of the relations of exchange in agriculture are as important as ownership of the means of production, especially land. It is true that the Nicaraguan experience, where the strategic Somoza group holdings passed directly to the state without
DOI link for was a root cause of its collapse) the MEDA does not define a new role for this class in the model. The strategy concentrates on modern farming as the most rapid way of resolving the agrarian accumulation problem - food and investible surplus. At most, assuming that there is sufficient administrative capacity and skilled labour to implement the strategy, it will benefit the APP and the CAS, about half of agrarian production but only a quarter of the rural population. It would take place, moreover, basically on the irrigated and fertile Pacific plain where two-thirds of the population resides. Meanwhile, the land reform itself has effectively established a middle farmer and service co-operative group which occupies over half the rural population and provides the other half of production; this group has no specific part to play in the MEDA. Depending on the circumstances, this group might either develop into a 'kulak' class dependent on the market and opposed to further agrarian reform or else collapse and migrate to the towns in the long run. But in any case, it will be responsible for the bulk of the food production in the short term (which may well last for a decade) and thus requires specific attention. To overcome this contradiction, which is already apparent, the APP would have to restore part of the role of estate agriculture in the rural economic formation, acting as a point of articulation for small and medium farmers instead of acting as a competitor to them. This articulation essentially implies subordinating them to the state rather than marginalising them, but also means shifting input and investment resources towards them in exchange for guaranteed production sold to the state. It is too early to make a definitive characterisation of the Nicaraguan agrarian reform, not only because the Sandinist Revolution is still in an initial tran-sitional stage, but also because of the current war conditions which, depending upon external political factors, could change the direction of social change. None the less, the nature of the agrarian reform project, the experience of its implementation to date, and the long-term agricultural development proposal do provide elements for some tentative conclusions. First, that the three lessons learned from other agrarian reform experiences were applied to some effect. Namely: (a) that production must be maintained throug the reform period, in order to avoid collapse of exports or falling urban living standards; (b) that the process of nationalisation should not proceed faster than the capacity of the state to assimilate the private sector; (c) that while individual land distribution should be avoided, co-operativisation should be voluntary and gradual. In this way, the collapse of productive forces as production relations are transformed was avoided. Second, that it is possible to effectively remove the control of agrarian capital over the economy without land expropriation as such, if the 'sur-rounding' mechanisms such as commercialisation, credit and inputs are used effectively. Indeed it might even be suggested that social control of the relations of exchange in agriculture are as important as ownership of the means of production, especially land. It is true that the Nicaraguan experience, where the strategic Somoza group holdings passed directly to the state without
was a root cause of its collapse) the MEDA does not define a new role for this class in the model. The strategy concentrates on modern farming as the most rapid way of resolving the agrarian accumulation problem - food and investible surplus. At most, assuming that there is sufficient administrative capacity and skilled labour to implement the strategy, it will benefit the APP and the CAS, about half of agrarian production but only a quarter of the rural population. It would take place, moreover, basically on the irrigated and fertile Pacific plain where two-thirds of the population resides. Meanwhile, the land reform itself has effectively established a middle farmer and service co-operative group which occupies over half the rural population and provides the other half of production; this group has no specific part to play in the MEDA. Depending on the circumstances, this group might either develop into a 'kulak' class dependent on the market and opposed to further agrarian reform or else collapse and migrate to the towns in the long run. But in any case, it will be responsible for the bulk of the food production in the short term (which may well last for a decade) and thus requires specific attention. To overcome this contradiction, which is already apparent, the APP would have to restore part of the role of estate agriculture in the rural economic formation, acting as a point of articulation for small and medium farmers instead of acting as a competitor to them. This articulation essentially implies subordinating them to the state rather than marginalising them, but also means shifting input and investment resources towards them in exchange for guaranteed production sold to the state. It is too early to make a definitive characterisation of the Nicaraguan agrarian reform, not only because the Sandinist Revolution is still in an initial tran-sitional stage, but also because of the current war conditions which, depending upon external political factors, could change the direction of social change. None the less, the nature of the agrarian reform project, the experience of its implementation to date, and the long-term agricultural development proposal do provide elements for some tentative conclusions. First, that the three lessons learned from other agrarian reform experiences were applied to some effect. Namely: (a) that production must be maintained throug the reform period, in order to avoid collapse of exports or falling urban living standards; (b) that the process of nationalisation should not proceed faster than the capacity of the state to assimilate the private sector; (c) that while individual land distribution should be avoided, co-operativisation should be voluntary and gradual. In this way, the collapse of productive forces as production relations are transformed was avoided. Second, that it is possible to effectively remove the control of agrarian capital over the economy without land expropriation as such, if the 'sur-rounding' mechanisms such as commercialisation, credit and inputs are used effectively. Indeed it might even be suggested that social control of the relations of exchange in agriculture are as important as ownership of the means of production, especially land. It is true that the Nicaraguan experience, where the strategic Somoza group holdings passed directly to the state without
ABSTRACT