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in the Limpopo valley harvest labour was needed for rice production at the agro-industrial complexes at the same time that the peasants needed to harvest their own plots. The colonial settlers had relied on force and on the use of task work to cope with this. Hence, the peasants would start very early in the morning to harvest a designated area at the settler farms and subsequently move on to their family plots. The wage would supplement the income and subsistence acquired from the family plot. However, when the state farms tried to introduce an eight-hour working day (instead of task work), they experi-enced an immense withdrawal of labour when it was most needed. The wage did not cover the consumption needs of a family throughout the year and, increasingly, money did not guarantee access to goods or did so only at the cost of accepting catastrophic reduction in the real wage. Similar shortage problems of labour were experienced in the plantation sectors, in food pro-duction in state complexes of Angonia or Zambezia, on cotton farms in the north, etc. The co-operative movement, which was never very strong since it had never received the effective material backing of the state, was further weakened by the fact that the development of parallel markets within the rural economy enfeebled the poorer peasantry even further. The latter would have to be the social force to be mobilised behind the co-operative movement; rather, it became economically weakened as a result of its rapidly deteriorating real incomes and the fact that the existing co-operative movement provided no real alternative. The government policy to link up purchase with sale so as to stimulate rural production did nothing to counteract this process of differen-tiation but, rather, tended to intensify it. Indeed, rural trade between the state and the peasantry was intermediated by private trade. The policy gave them an increased leverage over the peasantry and allowed them to channel more crops into the parallel markets since they effectively traded at terms of exchange which were less favourable than those laid down officially. Furthermore, the impact was that the supply of com-modities became concentrated in the hands of the richer peasantry (who had surpluses to sell) and this gave them leverage over the poorer peasantry. Finally, this process did not take place within conditions of peace but, rather, within an ever-spreading war situation. The South African-backed MNR was gradually spreading throughout the whole country and its acts of brutal oppression of the population and of sabotage and destruction of the whole network of social and economic infrastructure led to the increased destabilisation of the economy and society. To combat this force, a strong alliance between the army and the peasantry was necessary. But this alliance itself became weakened by the worsening of the economic situation of the peasantry. Economic investment was concentrated in bis projects within the state sector and these became the target of MNR attacks. On the other hand, the destabilis-ing effect of the concentration of resources on the state sector and of off-loading the burden of the costs on to the peasantry through the inflationary issue of money, unbacked by material resources, weakened the peasantry economically and intensified processes of differentiation. At the time of the preparation for the Fourth Congress it was not surprising
DOI link for in the Limpopo valley harvest labour was needed for rice production at the agro-industrial complexes at the same time that the peasants needed to harvest their own plots. The colonial settlers had relied on force and on the use of task work to cope with this. Hence, the peasants would start very early in the morning to harvest a designated area at the settler farms and subsequently move on to their family plots. The wage would supplement the income and subsistence acquired from the family plot. However, when the state farms tried to introduce an eight-hour working day (instead of task work), they experi-enced an immense withdrawal of labour when it was most needed. The wage did not cover the consumption needs of a family throughout the year and, increasingly, money did not guarantee access to goods or did so only at the cost of accepting catastrophic reduction in the real wage. Similar shortage problems of labour were experienced in the plantation sectors, in food pro-duction in state complexes of Angonia or Zambezia, on cotton farms in the north, etc. The co-operative movement, which was never very strong since it had never received the effective material backing of the state, was further weakened by the fact that the development of parallel markets within the rural economy enfeebled the poorer peasantry even further. The latter would have to be the social force to be mobilised behind the co-operative movement; rather, it became economically weakened as a result of its rapidly deteriorating real incomes and the fact that the existing co-operative movement provided no real alternative. The government policy to link up purchase with sale so as to stimulate rural production did nothing to counteract this process of differen-tiation but, rather, tended to intensify it. Indeed, rural trade between the state and the peasantry was intermediated by private trade. The policy gave them an increased leverage over the peasantry and allowed them to channel more crops into the parallel markets since they effectively traded at terms of exchange which were less favourable than those laid down officially. Furthermore, the impact was that the supply of com-modities became concentrated in the hands of the richer peasantry (who had surpluses to sell) and this gave them leverage over the poorer peasantry. Finally, this process did not take place within conditions of peace but, rather, within an ever-spreading war situation. The South African-backed MNR was gradually spreading throughout the whole country and its acts of brutal oppression of the population and of sabotage and destruction of the whole network of social and economic infrastructure led to the increased destabilisation of the economy and society. To combat this force, a strong alliance between the army and the peasantry was necessary. But this alliance itself became weakened by the worsening of the economic situation of the peasantry. Economic investment was concentrated in bis projects within the state sector and these became the target of MNR attacks. On the other hand, the destabilis-ing effect of the concentration of resources on the state sector and of off-loading the burden of the costs on to the peasantry through the inflationary issue of money, unbacked by material resources, weakened the peasantry economically and intensified processes of differentiation. At the time of the preparation for the Fourth Congress it was not surprising
in the Limpopo valley harvest labour was needed for rice production at the agro-industrial complexes at the same time that the peasants needed to harvest their own plots. The colonial settlers had relied on force and on the use of task work to cope with this. Hence, the peasants would start very early in the morning to harvest a designated area at the settler farms and subsequently move on to their family plots. The wage would supplement the income and subsistence acquired from the family plot. However, when the state farms tried to introduce an eight-hour working day (instead of task work), they experi-enced an immense withdrawal of labour when it was most needed. The wage did not cover the consumption needs of a family throughout the year and, increasingly, money did not guarantee access to goods or did so only at the cost of accepting catastrophic reduction in the real wage. Similar shortage problems of labour were experienced in the plantation sectors, in food pro-duction in state complexes of Angonia or Zambezia, on cotton farms in the north, etc. The co-operative movement, which was never very strong since it had never received the effective material backing of the state, was further weakened by the fact that the development of parallel markets within the rural economy enfeebled the poorer peasantry even further. The latter would have to be the social force to be mobilised behind the co-operative movement; rather, it became economically weakened as a result of its rapidly deteriorating real incomes and the fact that the existing co-operative movement provided no real alternative. The government policy to link up purchase with sale so as to stimulate rural production did nothing to counteract this process of differen-tiation but, rather, tended to intensify it. Indeed, rural trade between the state and the peasantry was intermediated by private trade. The policy gave them an increased leverage over the peasantry and allowed them to channel more crops into the parallel markets since they effectively traded at terms of exchange which were less favourable than those laid down officially. Furthermore, the impact was that the supply of com-modities became concentrated in the hands of the richer peasantry (who had surpluses to sell) and this gave them leverage over the poorer peasantry. Finally, this process did not take place within conditions of peace but, rather, within an ever-spreading war situation. The South African-backed MNR was gradually spreading throughout the whole country and its acts of brutal oppression of the population and of sabotage and destruction of the whole network of social and economic infrastructure led to the increased destabilisation of the economy and society. To combat this force, a strong alliance between the army and the peasantry was necessary. But this alliance itself became weakened by the worsening of the economic situation of the peasantry. Economic investment was concentrated in bis projects within the state sector and these became the target of MNR attacks. On the other hand, the destabilis-ing effect of the concentration of resources on the state sector and of off-loading the burden of the costs on to the peasantry through the inflationary issue of money, unbacked by material resources, weakened the peasantry economically and intensified processes of differentiation. At the time of the preparation for the Fourth Congress it was not surprising
ABSTRACT