ABSTRACT
As has been seen, the events which led to the Czech crisis had suggested that if war should break out Germany's initial offensive would probably be launched in the east. It was reasoned that if this should prove to be the case, there was every possibility that Britain would escape an onslaught from the air, provided that Bomber Command was committed to no offensive action that might provoke the Germans to retaliate. In such circumstances, it was deemed prudent to confine the activities of the bomber force to purely military objectives, at least in the opening phase of the war. In other words, the policy of restricted bombing was adopted simply because it was expedient to do so. There was no question of rejecting unrestricted bombing because it was felt that it contravened the laws of war. There were in fact no internationally agreed laws relating to air warfare; and in any case, official opinion in Britain inclined to the view that even if such laws were made they would be too artificial to survive the stresses of modern war. The belief that 'bombing, even if prohibited, could always be resorted to as an act of reprisal against some real or imagined breach of the laws of war" was still strongly held. The fact that after the Munich Agreement first priority was given to the restricted plans was simply an acknowledgement of the grave weakness of Bomber Command. Planning for the unrestricted operations was of course continued, for this weakness was considered to be no more than a temporary ill and one which would gradually be overcome as the squadrons were re-equipped with the larger and more powerful aircraft.
