ABSTRACT
Writing the history of intelligence operations is s tricky and hazardous undertaking. The writer is treading on slippery ground full of snares and delusions. First, there is a serious lack of sources; even four decades after the end of the Second World War a substantial portion of relevant sources still remain inaccessible to researching historians. Even more disastrously for historical research, there is good reason to assume that valuable information was never entrusted to, or was deleted from, the registry of any intelligence agency. Even after becoming accessible, the archives would not provide sufficient material to help or hinder the researcher. In the preface to his book on MI-6 Nigel West gives some telling examples. 1 Finally, the researcher has to rely largely on authors who belonged to the intelligence community. It is, however, obvious that writing one’s own history is not the best way to be objective, no matter how hard one tries. Moreover, these writers are subject to lapses of memory after so long; this cannot be denied despite the wealth of interesting and valuable information they pass on to their readers.
