ABSTRACT
During the early 1960s the Soviet Union conceded that a "revolution" had occurred in military affairs, brought about by the dominance of nuclear weaponry in contemporary warfare. This "revolution" recognized the destructive power of nuclear weapons, and, more important, the fact that the new weapons had an impact on strategic and operational matters as well as tactical. N. S. Khrushchev acknowledged this realization in 1960, and subsequently Soviet military doctrine, force structure, and military science reflected the impact of that "revolution." Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky's 1962 book Military Strategy perhaps best articulated the Soviet view of war in this new period. In brief, Sokolovsky stressed that war would be nuclear from the outset. Hence the conventional preoccupation with operational art and tactics faded in importance, and war at the strategic level became all-important. Soviet acknowledgment of "single option" nuclear war prompted wholesale force reorganization and marked the emergence of the strategic rocket forces as the most important element of the Soviet military forces. However, even during the "single option" period not all Soviet military theorists reconciled themselves to the reduced stature of the Soviet ground forces in future war.
