ABSTRACT
The neo-Ionian defence of science against Eleatic metaphysics rests at bottom on their vindication of locomotion: if things can move, science is possible; if locomotion is impossible, science falls with it. All three Eleatics argued against locomotion: Parmenides in 156. 26–33, Melissus in 168, Zeno by way of his four or five paradoxes. The neo-Ionian defence takes on only Melissus: Parmenides' obscure lines are justifiably ignored; and nothing is said against Zeno. I have no explanation of the latter omission: perhaps the paradoxes were unknown to the neo-Ionians; perhaps they were despised as sophisms or set aside as insoluble problems. With an adequate chronology some of that puzzlement might evaporate; but we have no adequate chronology (above, pp. 305–7). At best, then, the neo-Ionians will achieve a partial success: however powerful their arguments in Melissan country, they have still to fight on Zeno's territory.
