ABSTRACT

If lumps, chunks, pieces and masses of matter are, as individuals, sadly underestimated by most philosophers, artifacts, by being placed above them in the Aristotelian hierarchy, are grossly overrated. It is true that statues, spoons, invitation cards and dug-out canoes are by and large splendidly unitary objects, but they are not so qua artifacts. What is overrated is the role that being an artifact can play with respect to problems of unity and identity. The question is this: does its being an artifact of a particular kind, e.g. an ordinary spoon or bowl, supply a principle of unity and continuity for a substance independent of the sheer material coherence of its parts? And does their joint function unite the parts of a car or a tent in a way which is, from a logical point of view, superior to, or at any rate as good as, the way in which physical coherence unites the parts of a single piece of steel?