ABSTRACT
The argument so far has been an attempt to map at least roughly the theoretical forces which lay behind, and gave point to, Locke's usage of the term 'idea'. Some of the interplay between these forces has also been charted, their connection or lack of connection one with other, and the tensions between them which Locke either overlooked or failed to resolve in his evident struggle for coherence. In so far as the present attempt has been successful, a certain intelligible order has been revealed where the Essay's more recent readers (and some of its earlier ones) have been inclined to see only ambiguity and confusion. Some of the lacunae in the map will be filled in later chapters. For, as the variety and importance of the issues already discussed (however inadequately) might suggest, a full account of Locke's notion of an idea would be, in effect, an account of most of his general philosophy. Yet there is one virtual omission in particular which deserves to be mentioned at this point, and an attempt will soon be made to repair it.
