ABSTRACT
Since the early 1990s the European Union (EU) has actively supported a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via a multitude of bilateral agreements with the two parties, the facilitation of regional frameworks for dialogue, financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority, and participation in the Quartet, alongside the United States (US), Russia and the United Nations (UN). However, given the long-established diplomatic, political and economic links with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority on one hand, and in the absence of a viable peace ‘process’ for several years now on the other, the EU is invariably caught between its promising rhetoric on the desirable peaceful ending of the conflict and its lack of clout to turn words to tangible actions on the ground. This chapter begins with a brief background of the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict and the role of the EU and other third parties in trying to bring it to a peaceful resolution. The analysis of EU capabilities and the context of this conflict show that ultimately the EU has failed to make the necessary transition from rhetorical commitments to peace and stability in the conflict to meaningful actions on the ground which could change the stakes or impact on the disputants’ positions.
