ABSTRACT
The events which led to the US imposing the embargo on the transfer of all classified information, and which in turn led to the establishment of ASIO, began on 18 August 1947 when the British Joint Services Mission in Washington approached the Subcommittee for Information Control for information about the operating techniques of long-range missile proving grounds released to Australia along with complementary information about the guided weapons themselves. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this British request and recommended to SANACC that the information be provided. But when on 17 February 1948 the British made a further request for the release to Australia of all guided missile information, the approval of the Subcommittee of Military Information Control was questioned by the US Navy, which proceeded to make an issue of the Australian involvement in the Joint Project. It complained that when, in accordance with the Subcommittee’s recommendation of 18 August 1947, the navy had approached the Australian government offering information on proving grounds and associated missile information, it had sought in return information from Australia about testing at the range but, much to its chagrin, Australia had offered no reply. The navy now saw little legitimate need for Australia to be given advanced research and development data about the US guided missile programme, and to reinforce its objections it provided an unsolicited political judgement showing what it thought of Australia’s Labor Party government:
Because of political immaturity, a leftist government greatly influenced by communistic infiltrated labor organizations,
and the fact that Australian governmental activities have violated the basic security principle that classified infor mation should not be divulged to unauthorised persons Australia is a poor security risk.1
