ABSTRACT
Middle East Air Command was a vast square territory: from Gibraltar south to Takoradi in Ghana is nearly 2,200 miles; from Takoradi east to Aden in Yemen about 3,250; from Aden north to Habbaniya in Iraq 1,400; and from Habbaniya west to Gibraltar another 2,800.1 Churchill, advised by Beaverbrook, rejected Portal’s initial recommendation that Tedder be sent there as Longmore’s deputy, believing him to be a mere technician, ‘a man of nuts and bolts’; useful enough, but unsuitable for operational command and unlikely to provide inspirational leadership in a war currently being lost. ‘It was not true’, Churchill told Tedder in August 1942, ‘and I was not told the truth. I am sorry.’ 2
Yet Tedder’s record up to November 1940 suggests a man of pen and ink, if not of nuts and bolts, and Churchill had good reason to reject him. After Boyd’s disappearance, Sinclair, Portal and Freeman renewed their pleas on Tedder’s behalf and this time Churchill accepted them. He was reluctant to overrule the united opposition of such responsible persons when no other candidate of the necessary seniority sprang to mind. Perhaps Churchill reasoned that the appointment was merely to be deputy: Longmore himself had only been in command for six months (since May 1940) and should he prove inadequate, the matter would be looked at afresh. Tedder would certainly not succeed automatically and could meanwhile make himself useful as Longmore’s office manager in so vast a command. Perhaps also Tedder’s advocates took more care, after their first failure, to emphasise the tripartite capacity he had shown in Singapore: to command widely spread RAF forces, to co-operate effectively with commanders in other services, and to get on with civilian
authorities, both British and Malay. He had succeeded in all three roles in Singapore and could be expected to do at least as well in Cairo.
