ABSTRACT
SELF-RESTRAINT (HAVLAGAH) AS A DIVISIVE ISSUE The events of the years 1936-39 forced Jabotinsky to make dramatic tactical shifts while at the same time attempting to retain his fundamental assumptions. Once again, the NZO threatened to split. Shared hostility to the Zionist left and to Weizmann, even when combined with support for Jabotinsky's criticism of England, was insufficient: the increasing bloodshed demanded radical change, specifically the need for partisan and terrorist activity. To Jabotinsky's maximalist adherents, mainly in the IZL and its political adjunct, the 'Faction of Allegation and Faith', his supposed pro-British orientation seemed increasingly irrelevant. Even the British themselves found it barely credible. Throughout the period 1929-37, they considered Jabotinsky unreliable, in particular because of his reckless public statements, and prevented him from appearing in Palestine to testify before the Royal Commission of Inquiry. 1
The weakness and ambiguity of Jabotinsky's leadership were especially evident once Arab rioting broke out in 1936. On the one hand, he claimed that the riots had been planned by the Arabs with the assistance of British officials; on the other hand he ridiculed those who held that the British were hostile towards Zionism. 2 The IZL was itself divided in its response: its commander, Tehomi, opposed retaliatory acts, such acts were nevertheless carried out by the commander of the Tel Aviv branch, A. Krichevsky, together with his subordinates, H. Kalay, A. Haichman and B. Zeroni (all to be deeply involved in the split of 1940). 3 Apart from re-emphasising the possibility of an Italian orientation, Jabotinsky once again sank into the ambiguity of supporting 'self-restraint', hoping that the Jewish Legions might yet materialise.
