ABSTRACT
After Raziel's imprisonment on 19 May, the IZL's political views had become more extreme; under Kalay's command, the organisation adopted a more anti-British guise. The White Paper had added Britain to its catalogue of enemies. 1 Only because of the international crisis over Danzig did reprisal activity against the Arabs cease after 20 July. 2 Nevertheless the IZL claimed that its actions -the assassination of Clarke (11 June), the operation at the government broadcasting studios (30 June) and the assassination of Cairns and Barker - had 'undermined the White Paper policies'. 3 This was in marked contrast to the policy adopted by the Yishuv establishment. Indeed, all the 'arguments' and 'debates' at the twenty-first Zionist congress in Geneva 'were actually nothing but a question of ... surrender and acquiescence ... and of abandoning the homeland'. By insisting that the Jews work 'within the framework of the White Paper', the head of the Jewish Agency had revealed himself to be a 'British Agent'. 4
The outbreak of war revealed the extent to which the split within the IZL had widened. Unhesitatingly, Jabotinsky cabled immediate support to the President of Poland and ureservedly placed the NZO at the disposal of Britain and France. 5 Even though still in prison, David Raziel took a similar stand. Writing to the commanding officer of the British army in Palestine on 5 September, he unambiguously declared his allegiance to England: 'Our criticism of the methods of the Government regarding the fulfilment of the Mandate, was at no time meant to imply a hostile attitude to the British Government as such.' 6 But these sentiments did not reflect the mood of the IZL as a whole. Indeed, on the same day the national command (now controlled officially by Zeroni, but indirectly by Stern and Kalay) issued its Order No. 107, completely contradicting Raziel's statement and forbidding its members to join any volunteer service announced by the national institutions.
