ABSTRACT
Lehi was profoundly distrustful of Bevin's announcement of 18 February 1947 that the British government had decided to turn the Palestine question over to the UN. That, transparently, was nothing more than a typically British 'plot'. 'It was designed to strengthen Britain's position in the Middle East and to dissuade the Egyptian Premier, Nukrashi Pasha, from implementing his threat to take the Anglo-Egyptian dispute to the United Nations. Thus, Lehi contested the official Zionist analysis, which regarded Britain's departure from Palestine as an inexorable consequence of its impending withdrawal from India and Egypt. Those events, it prophesied, would only strengthen Britain's resolve to tighten its hold on Palestine, which would constitute its most important place d' armes between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, Lehi foresaw a situation in which the British would encourage 'Abdullah's armies' to march on Damascus and Aleppo. By thus extending the borders of the Hashemite monarchy to Turkey, the British hoped to bolster its antiSoviet front. Indeed, it was to precisely the same end that Britain was at this time constructing new military barracks in Palestine itself and bringing fresh divisions to serve there.'
