ABSTRACT

Unlike France and Britain, the German Empire had no territorial ambitions in the Nile valley. The nearest German colony to the Sudan was German East Mrica, or Tanganika. In the 1890s, further German hopes of colonial expansion in Mrica were concentrated on southern, rather than north-eastern, Mrica, where both the Transvaal and Mozambique were seen as potential additions to Germany's meagre list of colonial possessions. l Indeed, Germany had recognised the Upper Nile Valley as a British 'sphere' of influence as a result of the negotiations between the two powers which culminated in the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890.2 However, this did not imply that the British and Egyptian authorities could ignore the Germans when deciding to undertake the reconquest of the Sudan, nor that German reactions towards the campaign could be discounted. Lord Salisbury was acutely aware of this, for he appreciated that any forward move by AngloEgyptian forces was likely to antagonise the French. German support, or at least 'benevolent neutrality', was thus essential if the British were not to find themselves isolated among the European great powers. l

Several issues are raised by the German attitude towards the reconquest of the Sudan. First, the attitude of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the German government towards the initial British decision to send an expeditionary force to Dongola in March 1896 needs to be examined. In particular, it needs to be ascertained why they gave their support to the expedition. Second, the more ambivalent stance adopted by the Germans during the closing stages of the Omdurman campaign, and in the aftermath of Kitchener 's victory, must be interpreted. What does it reveal about Germany's policy objectives in the European and global contexts, and about the nature of foreign policy decision-making in Berlin? Finally, the consequences of the German attitude towards the reconquest of the Sudan for Anglo-German relations will be reviewed.