ABSTRACT
Historians have argued recently that the decision to form the R A F was a serious mistake. Claiming that it was an ill-conceived political reaction to quell public fears incited by insignificant German bombing, they contend that the R A F was formed not to satisfy organizational problems but to enable the retaliatory bombing of Germany, which, according to some, proved to be ineffective.2 Hence a current interpretation: that the R A F was an inconvenient administrative change designed primarily to permit the formation of the Independent Force (or Independent Air Force, IAF) and the undertaking of long-range bombing, and that the decision was based on inaccurate production estimates which led to the IAF 's failure to live up to expectations.3 Th is argument is invalid for several reasons. First, no one can say whether or not the I A F would have been significant in 1919; it was never expected to be decisive in 1918. Secondly, British production estimates were established with the awareness of forthcoming American industrial help. T h e facts that the United States failed to supply engines as anticipated and that British labor struck in 1918 should not be used to condemn prior estimates. Thirdly, three successive Air Boards had considered a separate air service already - not as a step toward retaliatory bombing but to solve the inefficiency of interservice competition. Finally, that Sykes and Weir were able to produce the I A F despite all the production obstacles shows that the estimates were not unrealistic.4
