ABSTRACT

During the period until 1974, UN involvement in Cyprus went through four distinct stages. The first involved the General Assembly and the issue of decolonization and self-determination for Cypriots. More active involvement arose after this initial stage, prompted by the constitutional crisis sparked by Archbishop Makarios in December, 1963, which led to the introduction of UNFICYP and a UN mediator. After 1967 the situation began to return to a semblance of normality and, as a result, the number of UN peacekeepers was reduced substantially and the mission of good offices appeared to lose its urgency. This third stage was to be rudely interrupted by the events of 1974. On the basis of this certain questions emerge. First, what were the views of the two sides of the peacemaking process? Secondly, did they expect it to achieve a compromise solution or to bolster their

negotiating positions? The following chapter develops the historical outline presented in the preceding one according to the theoretical framework in Part I and is an attempt to shed some light on these questions related to the disputants' views of UN peacemaking in Cyprus.