ABSTRACT
This chapter analyzes the PKK’s ability (as an ethnic insurgency group) to initiate violent incidents and/or to increase or decrease the level of violence after years of intense military counterinsurgency operations that resulted in its military defeat. As mentioned in the previous chapters, Turkey’s counterterrorism efforts have revolved around deterrence, and the main responsibility in the struggle against the Kurdish issue was granted to the Turkish Army. The army’s domination of the counterterrorism efforts led to the incapacitation of around 25,000 PKK militants through large-scale counterinsurgency operations. Many other militants were incarcerated through special courts and counterterrorism legislation (e.g., state security courts). In this context, it is crucial to identify whether defeating the PKK through the use of intense military action helped mitigate the PKK’s ability to initiate violent attacks against state troops in the context of the PKK as a guerilla insurgency group fighting against a regular state army. To this end, the ceasefire periods are examined in their effect on the overall violence trend. Particularly because the Turkish Government did not respond to the PKK’s ceasefires, by using aggregate-level data (both PKK initiated and as a result of military operations) the ceasefire periods are analyzed to identify whether the PKK ceasefire declaration (by also checking if the PKK stopped attacking in actuality) had an impact (decrease when declare ceasefire, increase when the ceasefire ends) upon the overall violence.
