ABSTRACT
Editor’s Introduction: The preceding chapters of this volume have sought to offer explanations for policy makers’ responses to signals that some major policy for which they are responsible may not be performing as expected. Although our nature as human beings, the structure of groups and organizations, and the requirements of politics tend to predispose policy makers toward continuing and even escalating their commitment to existing policies, that may not be the best approach – although sometimes it is. The contributors to this volume have sought to offer theoretical explanations that can account for the circumstances which may trigger the decisions to continue or decisions to adjust or change course. Of course, the critical task is deciding whether the existing policy is in some fundamental way mistaken. Perhaps the problem is with the intended goals. Alternatively the policy may be undermined by faulty strategy or procedures. Additionally there may be a fundamental failure to understand correctly the problem that a policy is intended to address. Whatever the reason for impending failure, the enormous obstacle to correction is the need to acknowledge an error, a mistake – to admit that we (the policy makers) were wrong. In this last chapter, I explore possible prescriptions for reducing the costs of acknowledging mistakes in foreign policy by changing the way policy is framed. More fundamentally, I suggest that subjecting new government initiatives to quasi-experimental designs would provide important evidence as to whether or not a policy is responsible for an observed result (i.e., failure or success). In keeping with the political psychology perspective of this volume, I draw on insights from this field.
