ABSTRACT
From the 1991 Gulf War, until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 shifted attention to irregular forms of warfare, the defence profession was dominated by the revolution in military affairs (RMA) hypothesis. Even with an increased emphasis on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the RMA has not disappeared. Rather, it has matured into the concept of military transformation.1 At the centre of the RMA hypothesis is the idea that periodically opportunities arise to transform the conduct of warfare. If pursued correctly, these changes may confer significant advantage to those who exploit them, and may even revolutionise the act of war. Perhaps not surprisingly, this hypothesis has not been universally accepted. Among a range of challenges to the hypothesis, problems with methodology have been identified, and the general applicability of military transformation has been questioned. This chapter will begin by outlining the origins and development of the RMA hypothesis. The chapter will pay particular attention to the ongoing information age RMA. Various challenges to the latter will then be discussed. The chapter will then discuss the role of technology in strategy, identifying it as an important but not decisive dimension. Finally, an assessment reveals whether the RMA hypothesis has any real utility in the theory and practice of strategy. Throughout this chapter, historical case studies will be used to illustrate the various sides of the debate.
