ABSTRACT
Until recently, Achaemenid historiography did not show much interest in the reign of Darius III, or in the state of the empire at the time Alexander set foot in Asia Minor. It sufficed to explain everything by the convenient thesis of the ‘colossus with feet of clay’ that had become irreversibly undermined by disorganization, overtaxation, and rebellious subjects.1 This thesis was, in itself, deemed sufficient to explain the Persian defeat in confrontations with the Macedonian armies.2 From its origins, Alexander historiography has developed two visions on the Persian adversary. One is found in handbooks and the most recent conference proceedings: that the Achaemenid empire is evanescent to such a degree that it does not even represent one of two players in the game about to be played on the Near Eastern chessboard: time passes ‘as if Alexander were alone … when he faced his personal quest.’3 In contrast, other historians have attempted to reevaluate the military and strategic capacities of the last Great King.4
