ABSTRACT
It is common to assume that in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE)1 moral action (praxis) incorporates its own excellence and thereby constitutes happiness itself, or that it points to the political realm wherein it is fi nally solidifi ed and validated. The Aristotelian defi nition of actions in terms of self-referring performances that include their practical ends (1140b 6-7) suggests the fi rst possibility, the undeniable fact that the Nicomachean Ethics is to be complemented by the Politics (1181b 12 ff) suggests the second. This disjunctive way of seeing things threatens to blur the worldly character of moral action, as I will argue by rehabilitating and analyzing the concept of prakton (plural: prakta)—a term intentionally left untranslated. This analysis of prakton will illuminate the worldly confi guration of moral action and its correlate visibility. In particular, I shall argue that prakta are not primarily internal to the agent but are parts of the visible world. Obviously, I do not mean that either the self and his ethical and intellectual dispositions or contemplation have no moral relevance, or that their role within the Nicomachean Ethics should be neglected. My point is rather that Aristotle’s ethics presupposes a conception of moral reality that contemporary interpreters disregard each time they approach ethics in terms of intentions, rational desires and happiness.
