ABSTRACT
The claim by reconstructionist and constructionist that histories can provide a true account of the past is based upon the synthesis or fusion of two distinct strands of empiricist thought. Empiricism is both a methodology by which one can acquire and test knowledge through observation, experimentation and examination and an epistemology (philosophy of knowledge) which argues that the empirical method guarantees direct access to reality as it is in itself. While empiricism as a methodology is not particularly problematic and is the core of the historical method, empiricism as a philosophical theory of knowledge is contested, and thought by many to be scepticism-inducing. The traditional understanding of historical knowledge, in addition to relying upon an empiricist epistemology, also depends upon a correspondence theory of truth which argues that a statement or proposition is true if it corresponds to reality. This is also usually accompanied by a belief in realism. Realism as a philosophical theory typically makes two kinds of claims about objects and their properties. Firstly, that they really exist, and secondly and more crucially, that they exist independently. This means that the existence and form of such objects and their properties are not dependent on one’s linguistic practices, interpretative frameworks or conceptual schemas: they exist independently of our apprehension of them. The theories of realism, empiricism and the correspondence theory of truth therefore work together to assert that the world exists as it is in itself, free from human perception, and that we can access this world in some way to make and verify knowledge claims about it. Our knowledge of the world (past or present) can thus be verifi ed
and described as true because, when expressed in the form of propositional statements, it corresponds to reality. Reality therefore acts as a foundation for our knowledge, and our knowledge accurately represents reality as it is in itself – hence the alternative names for realism: foundationalism or representationalism.
