ABSTRACT
These various initiatives took place within the context of the reappearance of a religious bourgeoisie as an important client to the authoritarian regime, a severe economic recession in the country, the US-led invasion of Iraq and the re-emergence of militant Islamist activity in the region, all of which have influenced the Syrian command to further compromise with domestic Islamic groups in order to consolidate its power. The compromises have involved promises of social acceptance, but more significantly, have included acquiescence to the idea of the creation of an Islamic political party within the Syrian Progressive National Front,10 something that would have been unthinkable less than ten years ago.11 When taken together, all of these developments demonstrate a clear willingness on the part of the Syrian state to open a new chapter in its relations with the country’s Islamic groups. They also signal an official shift in the country’s long-time secular stance, away from the previous understanding that religion was to remain outside the realm of politics and of the public sphere in general. Indeed, visitors to Syria today cannot but notice the increasing Islamization of public spaces, this in a society where public spaces have long been religiously neutral. It can be clearly seen in daily public conduct, styles of dress and speech, the charity work that is being done, the school system, summer camps, entertainment activities, financial institutions and even in architecture. And while secular governance still remains the guiding principle of the Syrian state, this movement of Islamic Renewal is also beginning to infiltrate the political sphere, challenging – although still indirectly – the secular state apparatus. The re-Islamization of the public sphere and the accommodating measures adopted by the state have not prevented the resurgence of militant Islamist activity in the country, as was made clear by the bloody attack of September 2008.12 The compromises have also recently given rise to a heated debate among Syria’s secular intellectual and political leaders regarding what the next move should be to halt the spread of what some are calling “de-secularizing interpretations and requests” within the country’s Islamic discourse. While these issues and events will be more closely examined in this work, one conclusion can already be drawn: that nearly 30 years after the Bathist regime’s harsh victory over the Muslim Brotherhood at the city of Hama, not
only is Bathist secularism13 receding in Syria’s political and social domains, but a new battle is underway between religious interests, secular interests, and the authoritarian state.14 Effectively, Islamic groups in the Syria of Bashar al-Asad are no longer under the control of the state,15 to the point that 2010 saw the Syrian Command directly announce the need to protect “Syrian secularism.”16
