ABSTRACT
For a whole generation, the question of minority rule in Southern Africa in the 1960s was a formative experience. Its question was: How could a world concerned about racism, apartheid, discrimination, and domination actually assist in bringing about change? The discussion posed violence against non-violence. The more repression increased in South Africa, the more many seemed to favor liberation struggles of the type just initiated in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde. However, the white settler-dominated societies of South Africa, South West Africa (today Namibia), and Southern Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) seemed to defy such challenges. Confronting a weak Portuguese empire was one thing; doing the same to entrenched, well-funded, and elaborate systems of white minority rule seemed another. In reality, neither challenge turned out to be simple. For many concerned about South Africa the choice was to work for international sanctions by governments, in addition to the consumer boycotts that emerged against South African products such as wine and oranges. Economic sanctions were seen as a reasonable choice. However, when the British government in 1965 and 1966 imposed wide-ranging sanctions on the regime of Rhodesia that declared unilateral independence, the debate shifted. Why did not the UK intervene militarily against this particular rebellion? Sanctions became debated in a new way. They came to be seen as an instrument of choice, when a political actor did not want to engage fully.
